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Abstract
In 2005, 3974 Canadians were on waiting lists for organ transplants and 275 patients
died while waiting. Canada's organ shortage has led to calls for changes to Canada's
organ donation system and its legal framework. Herein we examine an issue in which
law reform could both increase the number of available organs and better align practice
with respect for autonomy, a core value underpinning the Canadian legal system: the
issue of family overrides of a valid donor consent to postmortem donation. That is, we
examine what should happen when an individual consented to postmortem donation
but the family would like to override that consent. First, we examine the requirements
for valid donor consent. Second, we consider the legal status of family overrides of valid
donor consent in relation to postmortem donation. Third, we describe the available
data with regard to the practice of permitting families to override valid donor consent
and discuss the possible reasons for this practice. Finally, we describe and defend the
desired results with respect to law reform and describe the actions needed to realize
these results.
In 2005, 3974 Canadians were on waiting lists for organ transplants and 275 patients died
while waiting.1 Canada's organ shortage has led to calls for changes to Canada's organ
donation system and its legal framework. In this article, we examine an issue in which law
reform could both increase the number of available organs and better align practice with
respect for autonomy, a core value underpinning the Canadian legal system: the issue of
family overrides of a valid donor consent to postmortem donation. That is, we examine
what should happen when an individual consented to postmortem donation but the family
would like to override that consent. In Part I, we examine the requirements for valid donor
consent. In Part II, we consider the legal status of family overrides of valid donor consent in
relation to postmortem donation. In Part III, we describe the available data with regard to
the practice of permitting families to override valid donor consent and discuss the possible
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reasons for this practice. In Part IV, we describe and defend the desired results with
respect to law reform and describe the actions needed to realize these results.
I. Valid Consent Requirements
In the context of a paper on family override of valid donor consent, it is essential to first
clarify the legal requirements for valid donor consent to postmortem donation. It is also
important to look at this issue because many health care providers, donors, and substitute
decision makers do not understand the legal requirements for a valid consent. Both
substantive and procedural requirements must be considered.
A. Substantive Requirements
1. Age of donor giving the consent
In order for consent to postmortem donation to be valid, the donor must first meet the age
requirement in the applicable organ and tissue donation legislation. Generally mirroring
the jurisdiction's age of majority, the age is either 192 or 18,3 with the following
exceptions. In Ontario and Prince Edward Island, a donor 16 years or older can give
consent to postmortem donation, while in Quebec, consent may be given by a donor who is
14 years or older. In Manitoba, donors who are 16 or 17 years old may give a valid consent
if their parents or legal guardians, who are normally also required to consent, are
unavailable.4 With the exception of Prince Edward Island and Quebec, consent to
postmortem donation given by an individual who did not meet the statutory age
requirement is valid under the legislation if the person following it had no reason to believe
the donor was underage.
2. Capacity, voluntariness, and information
It is clear from most organ and tissue donation legislation that the following conditions
must be met for consent to be valid for purposes of inter vivos donation: the donor must be
mentally competent to consent and the consent must be free and informed.5 However,
these conditions are not found in the postmortem donation consent provisions of organ
and tissue donation legislation. With the exception of Quebec, Prince Edward Island, and
Manitoba, postmortem consent provisions state that a person of the appropriate age may
consent6 to postmortem donation in a prescribed format, without explicitly listing any of
the consent elements set out for inter vivos donation. In those jurisdictions that define
“consent” in their statutory definition sections, the term “consent” is defined as “consent
given under this act,” which indicates that no outside concept of consent should be read
into the act.7 The meaning of “consent” as used in the postmortem donation provisions and
what elements are implicitly required by the term have not been judicially interpreted.
However, given that the explicit requirements for consent to inter vivos transplantation
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were not used in the postmortem consent provisions, an inference that could be drawn is
that competence and free and informed decision making are not required for consent to
postmortem donation.
Although language about the elements of consent is included in the postmortem consent
provisions of the uniform Human Tissue Donation Act recommended by the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada, only Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Manitoba explicitly address
the elements. Prince Edward Island's Human Tissue Donation Act requires that the donor
“understands the nature and consequences of transplanting tissue from his or her body
after death” in order for his or her consent to be valid.8 However, under s. 3(2), the consent
is valid if the person who acts on it has no reason to believe it was not informed. Article
1399 of Quebec's Civil Code articulates the general rule that consent must be free and
enlightened and this applies to consent to postmortem donation. Under Manitoba's Human
Tissue Gift Act, a direction authorizing postmortem donation cannot be acted on if the
person who intends to follow it has reason to believe the donor was not capable of
understanding the nature and effect of the direction.9
Therefore, it is clear that, in the context of inter vivos donation, the requirements of a valid
consent are donor capacity and voluntariness and informed consent. It is not clear, in the
context of postmortem donation, which (if any) of these elements are required for valid
donor consent and there is a need for further work in this area.
B. Procedural Requirements
Canadian organ and tissue donation legislation, with the exception of Prince Edward Island,
specifies the format in which postmortem donor consent must be given in order for it to be
valid. If consent is not given in this format, then the donor has not given a valid consent
under the applicable postmortem consent provision. In those jurisdictions that have a
specific format for postmortem donor consent, all of the statutes permit consent to be given
in writing at any time and the majority require the writing to be signed.10 What constitutes
writing is clarified by provincial and territorial Interpretation Acts and their definition is
essentially the same: “‘writing,’ ‘written,’ or any term of like import, includes words
printed, painted, engraved, lithographed, photographed, or represented or reproduced by
any other mode in a visible form.”11 A valid legal writing requires words documenting in
any visible mode the consent of the individual to postmortem donation. Therefore, a signed
donor card is a valid legal document for indicating consent to postmortem donation.
In Saskatchewan, a jurisdiction which requires a signed writing, an individual is permitted
to place an orange sticker with the words “organ and tissue donor” on their signed health
card.12 Quebec issues organ donation information sheets and stickers with their health
cards that state: “I authorize the retrieval of my organs and tissue after my death. I have
advised my family: yes, no.” These stickers include a signature line, which states
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underneath “signature of the donor or guardian of the donor aged under 14 years old.”13
Both of these stickers meet the requirements for giving a valid consent for postmortem
organ donation. In Nova Scotia and Ontario, signed provincial health cards contain the
word “donor” and markers to document the fact that written consent has been registered
with the government. These cards are also valid indications of consent, as they contain the
word “donor,” which indicates the individual has consented and there is a signature.
Organ and tissue donation legislation in 7 jurisdictions also define the term “writing” to
include a will or other testamentary instrument, regardless of whether they are valid or
whether probate has been granted.14 In addition, valid consent to postmortem donation
can be given orally in the presence of at least 2 witnesses during the donor's last illness in
most jurisdictions, while Manitoba allows consent to be given in this way at any time.15
II. Legal Status of Valid Donor Consent and Family Override
A. Common Law
There are no Canadian court decisions that directly address the issue of family overrides of
valid donor consent in the context of postmortem donation. However, the common law16
does set out rules, rights, and duties with respect to dead bodies. Although it is a common
law rule that a human corpse is not property, the common law also recognizes a right to
possession of the corpse for the purposes of burial, in relation to an executor's legal duty to
bury the deceased.17 If there is no executor, then the right of possession and
corresponding duty to bury falls first to the spouse, and if there is no surviving spouse, then
to the next-of-kin.18 Under the common law, as the dead body is not property, the
expressed wish of an individual in regard to the disposition of his or her body after death is
not legally enforceable or binding on his or her executor or next-of-kin, even if expressed in
a will.19 In fact, unauthorized interference with an executor's or next-of-kin's “quasiproperty” right allows them to sue for damages, including damages for their emotional
distress resulting from mutilation of the corpse during an autopsy that they did not
authorize.20 However, this right to possession is not absolute and is “subordinate to the
demands of justice or public good.”21
Based on these common law rules to the issue of family overrides it might seem that
physicians and hospitals have a general duty to respect the wishes of the family, as the
expressed wish of the potential donor in regard to the disposition of his or her body is not
legally enforceable. However, it is important to note here (to counter any reliance on the
common law in support of a claim or demand for respect for a family override) that the
common law is not applicable in this context, because the common law is subordinate to
legislation.22 In the case of organ and tissue donation, provincial and territorial legislation
has displaced the common law, and these statutes are the primary source of legal authority

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2103815

for postmortem donation in all provinces and territories.23 We therefore turn now to the
legislation.
B. Legislation
1. Criminal code
Canada's Criminal Code24 contains a provision concerning respect for dead bodies. Under
section 182(b) of the Criminal Code, it is a criminal offense to improperly or indecently
interfere with or offer any indignity to a dead human body, whether buried or not. A
codification of a common law offense, this rarely used section has been applied in cases
involving sexual indecency to a corpse,25 disrespectful acts by neo-Nazis to Jewish
gravestones,26 and the purposeful destruction of coffins containing human remains.27 The
common law history of the offense indicates it was meant to prevent the sale of bodily
parts from corpses, protect public health by criminalizing the leaving of dead bodies in
public places, and deter other indignities to the corpse such as necrophilia.28 The lawful
removal of organs authorized by valid donor consent, although opposed by family, would
not attract criminal liability under this section given its purpose and the history of its
limited use in Canada.
2. Organ and tissue donation legislation
a. Authority
All provinces and territories except Quebec and Manitoba
Although there are some significant variations, the postmortem donation consent regimes
outlined in organ and tissue donation legislation share a number of fundamental
characteristics.29 Under the legislation, a person who meets the statutory age requirement
has the authority to consent to postmortem donation. His or her consent is full authority
for the removal and use of body parts for transplantation.30 There is no legal requirement
that the family must also consent.31 His or her consent is also binding authority: it must be
followed unless a legal exception applies.32 The Canadian Law Dictionary defines “bind” as
follows: “something that obligates or constrains the bound individual. A bind places one
under legal duties and obligations.”33 “Binding” in turn “[a]s used in a statute, commonly
means obligatory.”34 Family opposition does not fit within any legal exception. Therefore,
the current practice of respecting family opposition where there is valid donor consent
contravenes the law (except in Quebec and Manitoba, as discussed below).
Manitoba
In Manitoba, under The Human Tissue Gift Act, valid donor consent is full authority for
physicians to remove the donor's organs and tissues for postmortem transplantation but
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the consent is not binding.35 Therefore, it appears that it is legally permissible for
physicians to respect family opposition if there is valid donor consent in Manitoba, as
physicians are not legally required to follow the donor's consent. When faced with family
opposition, physicians may choose whether or not to exercise their authority under the Act.
Quebec
In Quebec, the current law governing consent to postmortem donation is found in the Civil
Code of Quebec, a statute which contains rules that govern “persons, relations between
persons, and property.”36 As in other provinces and territories, the law allows adults (as
well as minors 14 years and older) to authorize postmortem donation. The Code specifies
that “the expressed wishes shall be followed, except for a compelling reason.”37 What
constitutes a compelling reason is not defined in the Code and does not appear to have
been judicially interpreted.38 Therefore, while the Code is explicit in establishing a legal
duty to follow the donor's expressed wishes, it appears to be open to interpretation under
the current law whether family opposition constitutes a compelling reason to not abide by
them.39
b. Statutory exceptions
With the exception of Quebec, organ and tissue donation legislation in Canada contains 2
statutory exceptions to the binding nature of valid donor consent. First, persons may not
act on valid donor consent if they have reason to believe the donor subsequently withdrew
his or her consent. Second, if the donor's death requires an investigation by a provincial or
territorial coroner or medical examiner, valid donor consent is not actionable unless the
medical examiner or coroner allows the procurement to proceed.40
A third exception exists in all provinces and territories except Manitoba, Quebec, the
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut.41 Generally, this exception states that if a
postmortem gift (the body or body parts specified in the consent) cannot be used for the
purpose in the consent, it shall be dealt with and disposed of as if no consent had been
given.42 Valid donor consent is no longer binding if the donated body or body parts are
unusable for any reason, eg, if the donor has leukemia or multiple sclerosis. For obvious
reasons, this exception does not provide legal authority for family overrides of valid donor
consent.
Two additional statutory exceptions exist in Manitoba and Quebec. In Manitoba, a direction
cannot be acted on if the person seeking to follow it has reason to believe the donor was
not capable of understanding the nature and effect of the direction.43 As noted earlier, in
Quebec, valid donor consent does not have to be followed where there is a compelling
reason not to do so (although what constitutes a compelling reason is unclear in the law).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2103815

c. Good faith immunity clauses
With the exception of Quebec, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut, organ and tissue
donation legislation contains good faith immunity clauses that provide personal liability
protections. The wording of these provisions in most provinces is as follows: “No action or
other proceeding for damages lies against any person for any act done in good faith and
without negligence in the exercise or intended exercise of any authority conferred by this
Act.”44 Therefore, persons are protected from civil liability where they could otherwise be
liable, if they acted in good faith and without negligence when exercising their authority
(under valid donor consent) to remove tissue for postmortem donation. Two quotes from
previous Canadian cases are illustrative of the way in which the courts will understand
“good faith”:
…the state of mind in executing a duty: the officer must have acted in “good faith,” ie,
believing in facts which, if true, would have justified what he did.…The contrast is with an
act of such a nature that it is wholly wide of any statutory or public duty, ie, wholly
unauthorized and where there exists no colour for supposing that it could have been an
authorized one. In such case there can be no question of good faith or honest motive.45
“Good faith” and its opposite, “bad faith,” import a subjective state of mind, the former
motivated by honesty of purpose and the latter by ill-will.46
The good faith immunity clauses in the organ and tissue donation legislation protect
physicians in the context of postmortem organ and tissue donation if physicians act
honestly, without malice, ill-will, and negligence, in the execution of their authority to
remove organs or tissue, and if they have no reason to think that they are making a
mistake.47 Ontario's good faith immunity provision is broader in that it does not require
physicians to act “without negligence” for its protections to apply.48 It also protects both
acts and omissions.
3. Consent legislation
Several provinces and territories have passed consent legislation related to health care that
is separate from their organ and tissue donation legislation. However, such legislation does
not alter the conclusions drawn in the preceding section, because either the organ and
tissue donation legislation supersedes the consent legislation, or the consent legislation is
silent or consistent with the organ and tissue donation legislation. Each of these
possibilities is considered herein.
First, consent to organ and tissue donation is primarily governed by the consent rules
outlined in organ and tissue donation legislation. In British Columbia, Alberta,
Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, the Yukon, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, organ
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and tissue donation legislation defines consent as “a consent given under this act.”49
Although this phrase has not been judicially interpreted, it supports the argument that
organ and tissue donation legislation is intended to be a complete consent regime in these
jurisdictions.50 Prince Edward Island's organ and tissue donation consent regime has
primacy, as the province's Human Tissue Donation Act states that “consent to the removal
of tissue for the purposes of this Act may be given in accordance with this Act, but not
otherwise.”51 British Columbia's Human Tissue Gift Act has a provision stating that it is not
affected by the province's Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act.52 In
addition, health care consent legislation may also contain provisions stating that the
legislation does not apply to consent to tissue donation, as is the case in Ontario, or that the
legislation is subject to the province's tissue legislation and in case of conflicts, the tissue
legislation prevails.53
Second, consent legislation either is silent on the issue of tissue donation, creates additional
rules relating to the authority to consent to inter vivos transplantation,54 or contains
provisions barring substitute decision makers from consenting to tissue donation55 or
requiring them to do so in accordance with the expressed wishes of the individual while
capable.56 Nothing in the provincial and territorial health care consent statutes diminishes
the binding nature of a donor's consent or grants family members the authority to override
a valid donor consent given under provincial and territorial tissue legislation.
C. Conclusion
In all jurisdictions except Manitoba and Quebec, family members have no legal authority to
override valid donor consent to postmortem donation. In Manitoba, physicians may legally
choose to respect family opposition to donation even in the face of valid donor consent
because donor consent is not binding. In Quebec, family members have legal authority to
override valid donor consent if family opposition is a “compelling reason” not to follow
donor consent.
III. Current Practice with Regard to Family Overrides
A. What Is Happening?
A 2006 Canadian survey examined the attitudes of health care professionals in regard to
valid donor consent to postmortem donation and family overrides.57 Sixty-nine percent of
the health care providers believed that the wishes of the family or next-of-kin would be
respected over the wishes of the donor (as recorded on a signed donor card or in a donor
registry). A similar survey of public awareness and opinions indicated that 64% of
Canadians believed that the wishes of the deceased (as recorded on a signed donor card or
in a donor registry) are followed over the wishes of the family.58 These surveys do not
provide concrete evidence as to how many organs are actually lost due to family overrides.
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However, if the physicians (69%) and members of the public (36%) who believe that family
overrides are being respected are correct, this would represent a significant disregard for
donor wishes as well as a significant loss of potential donor organs.
B. Why Is It Happening?
1. Lack of understanding of the law
One factor contributing to respect for family opposition when there is valid donor consent
may be a lack of understanding of the law in this area. Physicians and organ transplantation
programs may mistakenly think some expressions of intent do not constitute valid consent.
For example, Alberta's Human Organ Procurement and Exchange Program, based in both
Edmonton and Calgary, states on their Edmonton website that a signed donor card is only a
record of the donor's wish to donate and the next-of-kin is required to give consent for
donation to happen.59 However, a completed Alberta donor card, located on the back of
the province's health card, is a valid indication of legally binding consent, as it has both
words of consent and a signature. New Brunswick's Department of Health answers the
question “Can my next-of-kin withhold permission even if my organ donor card is signed?”
by explaining that under the Act, the person entitled to consent will be approached and
discouraged from overriding the donor's known wishes. However, New Brunswick's signed
donor card is a valid indication of legally binding consent, not a record of the donor's
wishes, and the province's Human Tissue Gift Act does not entitle anyone else to refuse
consent where there is valid donor consent.60
Alternatively, physicians and programs may think that they are legally required to follow
family overrides, as they may believe that valid donor consent is insufficient authority for
organ procurement and final consent is required from the family. For example, the Yukon
Organ Donation Program states that the family will be asked for final consent even if the
donor has signed a registration card.61 There also appears to be confusion about the
binding nature of valid donor consent. Ontario's Trillium Gift of Life Network recognizes
that valid donor consent provides sufficient authority for organ procurement despite
family opposition. Yet, their website states that a signed donor card “does not mean that
the doctors must recover your organs” in answer to the question of why families can
override a valid donor consent.62 In Prince Edward Island, valid donor consent is also
binding.63 However, the government's website explains that “although not required by
law, a physician will not engage in the organ retrieval process if the family is opposed.”64
This statement is inaccurate in respect to its statement about the law in that valid donor
consent is binding and the law requires physicians to follow the donor's valid consent even
if the family is opposed.
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Several public statements reflect confusion about the law or, at a minimum, may create
confusion for others in regard to the law. In Nova Scotia, principles of Nova Scotia Organ
and Tissue Donation Strategies include:
The wishes of the patient's family are of paramount importance. Consent for donation is
always requested from the patient's substitute decision maker (legal next-of-kin). Prior
discussion and documentation of an individual's wishes can facilitate and support the
families' decision making process. Families who are aware of their loved one's wishes
almost always support those wishes. Documentation of an individual's wishes is not used
as a legal tool to override the next-of-kin's decision—the family has the final say.65
Information distributed by Newfoundland's organ procurement program tells people that
organ donation is a two-step process and instructs them to both sign a donor card and
inform their family of their decision, as the family will be asked to give consent after the
individual's death.66 On the Saskatchewan's government website, individuals interested in
being organ donors are told they can place an “organ and tissue donor” sticker, as
discussed previously, on their health card, but “the stickers themselves do not guarantee a
donation—that decision is left to your next-of-kin.”67
2. Concern for the feelings of the family
Another motivating factor for respecting family opposition where there is valid donor
consent may be a desire not to upset families. An explanation that is commonly given for
why families can override valid consent is “respect for the feelings of grieving families.”68
However, it has also been argued that the best way to respect the grieving family is not to
ask them to consent to donation where there is already valid donor consent, as it places an
undue burden of decision making on the family.69 Rather, the grief of families can still be
addressed by informing them of the deceased's consent and offering them counseling and
support where the family disagrees, as is the case with the Center for Organ Recovery and
Education (CORE) program that operates in regions of Pennsylvania, New York, and West
Virginia.70
3. Fear of lawsuits by family
Physicians and organ procurement agencies may fear civil liability if they proceed in the
face of family opposition. However, with the possible exception of Quebec and its
“compelling reason” exemption, physicians who act on valid donor consent in accordance
with the applicable organ and tissue donation legislation are not exposed to civil liability
even if the family opposes, as their actions are lawful and the family has no basis for legal
action. As explained earlier, most jurisdictions provide further protection through good
faith immunity clauses. Furthermore, we were not able to find any reported decisions of
physicians being successfully sued by families for following a valid donor consent.
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4. Public perception
Organ procurement and transplantation programs may be concerned that following the
donor's valid consent over the wishes of the family may have a negative impact on the
public's perception of their program. However, the surveys cited above indicate that a very
strong majority of Canadians surveyed believe that valid donor consent should be followed:
89% of the public believed that the wishes of the donor should be respected.71 A recent
report by Ontario's Citizens Panel on Increasing Organ Donations concluded after its public
consultation process that “both in discussions and in survey results, the position of
Ontarians was unanimous—they want their wishes respected and overridden by no
one.”72 This suggests that there would be no negative impact on public perception (indeed,
the impact of respecting donor consents would likely be positive).
IV. Recommendations for Reform
With the exception of Manitoba and possibly Quebec, organ and tissue donation legislation
does not permit valid donor consent to be overridden by families. This statutory position
enjoys strong public support, as evidenced by further results from the 2006 survey
mentioned above. This statutory position is also ethically sound, as it is supported by the
principle of autonomy, the recognition that the donor has interests which survive past
death and should be respected, and the substantial benefit of prolonged or improved
quality of life experienced by transplant recipients. It has been argued that respecting the
grieving family's desire not to donate is justifiable because it is family interests that are
impacted the most by organ donation, whereas the donor is dead.73 Critics of this
argument contend that failing to respect the donor's valid consent violates his or her
autonomy and there are individual interests that survive death, such as the expressed
wishes of the deceased in a will, that are respected despite family opposition74 and, as has
been noted in the literature, the altruistic giving of one's organs and tissues can be argued
to be a more personal and intimate decision than the disposal of one's property in a will
and deserves equal, if not more, respect.75 Lastly, just as coroners' legislation permits
forensic autopsies without family consent because of larger societal interests in justice,76
provincial and territorial organ and tissue donation legislation that makes valid donor
consent full and binding authority for donation and transplantation regardless of the
family's wishes can be said to reflect the larger public interest in respecting individual
autonomy and prolonging life.
By ensuring that current practice is aligned with the law, the intent of both the donor and
the legislation will be realized: more lives will be saved or improved. The grief of the family
need not be ignored as supports can be put in place to help families that oppose donation
understand the implications of their loved one's consent.77 A combination of law and
policy reform, practice reform, and education is recommended below to achieve a
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consistent and coherent approach that respects valid donor consent and maximizes
postmortem organ procurement from donors who have given valid donor consent.
A. Law Reform
In 1987, when the Uniform Law Conference of Canada was considering amendments to its
uniform tissue donation statute, it was recommended that “the next-of-kin should not be
able to countermand the wishes of the deceased.”78 It was further recommended that this
issue be addressed through education rather than through law reform, as the legislation
was sufficient. However, given the obviously limited success of education alone in the past
20 years to rectify the situation, as evidenced by the multitude of government and organ
donation program websites that still state that the family can override valid donor consent,
law reform should be undertaken in addition to education. We recommend that:
1
The legal requirements (substantive and procedural) for a valid consent should be clearly
set out in organ and tissue donation legislation. In particular, to reduce the potential for
uncertainty, valid forms of “writing” should be clearly identified in regulations (made
under organ and tissue donation legislation), eg, that “writing” includes organ donor cards.
Further legal research is needed to examine what the substantive requirements should be
for valid consent to postmortem donation. This research should consider the possible
consequences of including informed consent as a requirement (eg, how such a requirement
would affect the format and process for giving consent to postmortem donation).
2
The word “binding” should be explicitly defined in organ and tissue donation legislation
(ie, “binding” means the consent must be followed unless clearly articulated statutory
exceptions are met). Manitoba should add the word “binding” to its postmortem donor
consent provisions. All jurisdictions that have “binding” consent should have an exception
similar to section 9 of Nova Scotia's Human Tissue Gift Act, which provides for
circumstances in which the organs and tissues are unusable.
3
Quebec should clarify that family opposition is not a compelling reason not to follow the
donor's wishes expressed in a valid consent.
B. Policy Reform
Policy reform is needed so that policies and protocols regarding organ donation and
procurement clearly and accurately reflect the law; specifically, that valid donor consent
must be followed and cannot be overridden by the family (except in Manitoba and Quebec).
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The policy statements of British Columbia's Transplant Society, an agency of the provincial
health services authority that directs, delivers, or contracts for all organ transplant services
in British Columbia, should be considered a possible Canadian model for policy reform.
This Society's website accurately reflects the law in this area and clearly states that their
registration form is valid legal consent under British Columbia's Human Tissue Gift Act.
According to their website, the medical staff will always follow valid donor consent and the
family will be approached with a copy of the donor's valid consent to inform them of the
donor's decision.79 The Society's experiences with their policy could be used to inform the
creation of policies throughout Canada.
C. Education and Public Awareness
Legal education and public awareness programs will be crucial to the success of efforts to
inform all relevant stakeholders that the current practice of respecting family opposition
over valid donor consent is not legally acceptable. The current law should be taught in
relevant health professional degree programs, such as nursing and medicine, and should
form part of continuing education programs for health professionals working in this field.
Once policy reform is in place, public awareness of the legally binding nature of valid donor
consent—and the benefits of giving such consent, such as saving lives and reducing the
burden of decision making on one's family—should be increased and included as part of
organ donation awareness programs. Public information should be correct and any
necessary changes should be made to websites and other media.
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Notes
1
S.A. Fenton
2006 CORR Preliminary Report: Preliminary Statistics on Organ Donation,
Transplantation and Waiting ListPresented at the CST Annual Meeting, March 2006
http://www.cihi.ca/corr
2
Nunavut Human Tissue Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. H-6, as duplicated for Nunavut by s. 29
of the Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28; the Northwest Territories Human Tissue Act, R.S.N.W.T.
1988, c. H-6; the Yukon Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 117; British Columbia Human
Tissue Gift Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 211; New Brunswick Human Tissue Gift Act, S.N.B. 2004, c.
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H-12.5; Nova Scotia Human Tissue Gift Act R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 215; Newfoundland and
Labrador Human Tissue Act, R.S.N. 1990, H-15.
3
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